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Abstract
We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games
started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new
notion of equilibrium which we call ε-estimated equilibrium and prove its ex-
istence for any positive ε. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic
games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming,
and Berk–Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. At the same
time, our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmei-
dler (1973), pointed out by Shapley. In that paper the existence of pure-strategy
Nash equilibria has been proved for any nonatomic game with a continuum of
players, endowed with an atomless countably additive probability. But, requiring
Borel measurability of strategy profiles may impose some limitation on players’
choices and introduce an exogenous dependence among players’ actions, which
clashes with the nature of noncooperative game theory. Our suggested solution
is to consider every subset of players as measurable. This leads to a nontrivial
purely finitely additive component which might prevent the existence of equi-
libria and requires a novel mathematical approach to prove the existence of
ε-equilibria.
1 Introduction
The original framework of Schmeidler. Games with a continuum of anony-
mous players were introduced by Schmeidler in [32] where he also proved the existence
∗Acknowledgments to be added.
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of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for these games.1 At the time, there were models of
markets and cooperative games with infinitely many players, but not of noncooper-
ative games. In [32], the players’ space is modelled to be the unit interval endowed
with the Borel σ-algebra and the Lebesgue measure, where there is a finite set of
actions and each player chooses an action from this set. The utility of each player
depends on the distribution of actions across all players and the action he chooses.
The interpretation is that the same game is repeated in each period. The payoff, in
utils, is received at the end of the period. At the same time, because of the anonymity
assumption, the strategic complications of repeated games are meaningless here. A
paradigmatic example is that of daily commuters driving downtown (or back home)
and having to choose a bridge (or tunnel) to enter the city. Thus, in each period they
play a one-shot game, analyzed in [32]. Here, the metaphysical assumption of correctly
guessing what other players will do, required for playing a Nash equilibrium strategy
in one-shot games, is mitigated by two factors. The first is minor: each player has to
guess correctly the distribution of the strategy (the same guess for all). The second is
major: there is regularity in the daily traffic of commuters. Schmeidler [32] formalizes
these intuitions. The limitations of this model are discussed below.
Our motivations. The goal of our paper is to generalize the above finding in
several directions. We are motivated by three main observations:
(i) In recent years, alternative, and perhaps more realistic, notions of equilibrium
have been developed for noncooperative games with finitely many players. At
the same time, these notions have not been considered for nonatomic anony-
mous games. In particular, we have in mind equilibrium concepts which allow
for beliefs to be not necessarily correct, but nonetheless consistent with the in-
formation possessed by each player whether it is endogenously or exogenously
generated. Thus, our goal is to bring these more realistic notions of equilibrium
to nonatomic anonymous games which model exactly situations where individu-
als are negligible and are not fully aware of the strategic environment surrounding
them. This renders sophisticated strategic reasoning, such as Nash equilibrium
(and any of its refinements) or rationalizability, less plausible.2
1Theorem 1 in [32] is a special case of the last theorem of Schmeidler’s Ph.D. dissertation in
mathematics titled “Games with a continuum of players” ; submitted and approved in 1969, at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The problem was inspired by the moonlighting job of the author as
a member of a team advising on Tel Aviv transportation.
2We are not after proving any sort of “translation principle”, that is, a principle for which any
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(ii) In a personal conversation with Schmeidler (in the early 1970s), Shapley pointed
out a problem with the modelling of a nonatomic population of players as the unit
interval with the Lebesgue measure on Borel sets. As in some mathematical sense
there are more nonmeasurable sets than measurable sets in the unit interval, the
game, that is the payoff function, may not be defined out of equilibrium. In
a similar vein, as later formalized in a general equilibrium framework, Dubey
and Shapley [11] raise another issue with the measurability assumption. The
measurability of a strategy profile (and similarly of the profile of utilities, which
is a common assumption) yields its “near” continuity.3 This in turn clashes with
the noncooperative idea of strictly independent decision-making, since “close
players” tend to play “close strategies”.
(iii) In modelling a large population of players in which each agent “has the same
negligible weight”, Schmeidler opted for the infinite set of points in the unit
interval endowed with the Lebesgue measure. At the same time, as noted by
Aumann [3], in analyzing economies with a continuum of traders, “the choice of
the unit interval as a model for the set of [players] is of no particular significance.
A planar or spatial region would have done just as well. In technical terms, [the
players’ space] can be any measure space without atoms.” Thus, for example,
one could alternatively model the players’ space as the set of natural numbers
endowed with a natural density. Our goal is to take Aumann’s remark verbatim
and not commit to any particular specification of the players’ space in order to see
how much of our analysis can be carried out in a general space without atoms.
More formally, we suggest using Savage’s structure of nonatomic probabilities
defined on the power set of the space of players (Section 2).
Our contributions. Our second and third motivation bring us to model the
players’ space as a set T endowed with a nonatomic probability λ defined on all sub-
sets T . Using a measure over the power set takes care of both Shapley’s and Aumann’s
comments. In particular, by considering the power set, we allow for the most permis-
sive measurable structure possible, since any profile of strategies or utilities becomes
automatically measurable. Measuring the subsets of players/coalitions according to
equilibrium notion developed for a finite-players framework easily translates, in terms of existence,
to a nonatomic setting.
3This intuition is based on Lusin’s Theorem which states that for each ε > 0 each measurable
function is continuous when restricted to a suitable compact set which has a measure of at least 1− ε
(see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1, Theorem 12.8]).
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a nonatomic probability on the power set is consistent with Savage’s [31] approach
and equivalent to having a qualitative probability on the players’ space, satisfying ax-
iom P6’. However, modelling the players’ space in this generality implies that Nash
equilibria might fail to exist (see Example 1 based on Khan, Qiao, Rath, and Sun
[19]).
This naturally brings us to look at ε-equilibria and to our first motivation. We in-
troduce a concept of approximate equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, which
we call ε-estimated equilibrium. This notion of ε-equilibrium encompasses several
approximate equilibrium concepts: ε-self-confirming (ε-SCE), ε-peer-confirming (ε-
PCE), and ε-Berk–Nash (ε-BNE). These equilibria and their ε-versions are formally
defined and discussed in the relevant sections, Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 (see also the
related literature below). They were mostly developed for finite games and, inter alia,
in this paper we extend them to nonatomic games. Nevertheless, the principles behind
their definitions in a finite-players framework naturally translate to a nonatomic setup.
The common thread behind ε-SCE, ε-PCE, and ε-BNE in an anonymous nonatomic
game is the following scheme, which is also the basis for our ε-estimated equilibria:
1. Every player best-responds to his beliefs (optimality);
2. The belief of every player is consistent with what he can observe (ε-discrepancy).4
Where these types of equilibrium differ is how point 2 is formalized, since point 1 is
translated in the same way for all of them. In particular, in SCE, each player receives a
message which is a function of the action he takes and the distribution of actions of the
other players. In equilibrium, almost every player best-responds to a distribution that
generates a message which is ε-close to the message generated by the true distribution
of the actions. In PCE, the message each player receives is the distribution of the
actions conditional on a subset of players: his peers. Thus, almost all the players
best-respond to a distribution which is ε-close to the true distribution of actions of
their peers, not of all the players. In both ε-SCE and ε-PCE the distributions to which
players best-respond are ε-close in terms of observables to the true one; thus they are
endogenously generated. By contrast, in BNE, each player t entertains an exogenous
set of possible distributions of actions, denoted by Qt, that he believes are accurate in
describing other players’ behavior. Moreover, he is not willing to depart from Qt. So
in equilibrium, almost every player best-responds to a distribution which is ε-close to
4More precisely, we require points 1 and 2 to hold for every player except a null set of them (see
also point 1 of Remark 1).
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the best estimate in Qt of the true distribution of actions, according to a statistical
measure.
Our notion of ε-estimated equilibrium provides a framework where we can account
for all the three different features described above: that is, the distribution of actions
used by each player in equilibrium is ε-close, whether in statistical terms or proper
distance, to the set of all distributions which are compatible with the true one. This
latter set can be exogenously determined as in BNE or endogenously generated as in
SCE or PCE.
In Theorem 1, under mild assumptions, we prove that ε-estimated equilibria al-
ways exist. As particular cases, we obtain the existence of self-confirming ε-equilibria
(Corollary 1), peer-confirming ε-equilibria (Corollary 3), and Berk–Nash ε-equilibria
(Corollary 4). Despite the fact that standard Nash equilibria might fail to exist, we
prove that ε-Nash equilibria do exist (Corollary 2). Finally, mimicking the notion of
rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (see Rubinstein and Wolinsky [29]), we also
propose a definition of rationalizable estimated equilibrium and discuss its existence
(Remark 1).
Related literature. The seminal contribution of Aumann [3] (in a general equi-
librium framework), followed by Schmeidler [32] (in a game-theoretic framework), ini-
tiated a large literature where the negligibility of agents is modelled via a nonatomic
probability players’ space (see, e.g., Khan and Sun [23] for a survey).5 We will next dis-
cuss the relevant literature by connecting it to our three main motivations/contributions.
(i) Our definition of ε-estimated equilibrium seems to be new. At the same time, it
encompasses three types of equilibrium: self-confirming (SCE), peer-confirming
(PCE), and Berk–Nash (BNE) which were developed almost exclusively for
games with finitely many players, respectively, by Battigalli [6] as well as Fuden-
berg and Levine [14] (SCE), Lipnowski and Sadler [24] (PCE), and Esponda and
Pouzo [12] (BNE). The only exceptions seem to be SCE and BNE, which were
also studied for population games, where the latter can be seen as a very special
form of nonatomic games. Moreover, we also consider ε-versions of the above
5Many subsequent papers extended Schmeidler’s results to more general players’ spaces, but where
λ is always assumed to be countably additive and A is allowed to be infinite: see, e.g., Balder [5],
Khan and Sun [21], Khan, Rath, and Sun [20], Rath [27], and the references therein. The scope of this
type of results is analyzed in Carmona and Podczeck [9]. Finally, in the same setting of Schmeidler
[32], Jara-Moroni [16] extends the notion of rationalizability to nonatomic anonymous games while
Rath [28] investigates the issue of existence of perfect, proper, and persistent equilibria, being all of
them refinements of Nash equilibrium.
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three concepts of equilibrium. In discussing ε-SCE of course, two approaches
are available. The first assumes that: a) players best-respond to their beliefs,
but b) beliefs are only ε-consistent with evidence. The second requires that: a’)
players ε-best-respond to their beliefs, but b’) beliefs are perfectly consistent.
For games with finitely many players, the first approach was introduced by Bat-
tigalli [6] and Kalai and Lehrer [17] and [18], while the second was proposed
for pure equilibria by Azrieli [4]. For nonatomic games, other than population
games, the first approach seems to be unexplored, while the second was studied
by Azrieli [4]. Using the same setting as Schmeidler, that is, assuming that the
players’ space is the unit interval with the Lebesgue measure, Azrieli shows that
self-confirming equilibria exist (that is, when ε = 0), but when utility depends
on the entire profile of strategies and the message feedback is the distribution
of actions.6 Moreover, in trying to obtain the nonatomic games of Schmeidler
as a limit of finite-players games which become arbitrarily large, he shows that
self-confirming ε-equilibria eventually exist.7 Finally, Azrieli limits his analysis
to the case where there is nonmanipulable information also known as own-action
independence of feedback. Loosely speaking, this is the case when the feedback
each player receives does not depend on the action taken by the player. This
rules out several interesting cases.
In our work, we opt for a definition of ε-SCE which requires rational optimiza-
tion on the players’ side, but allows them to entertain ε-consistent beliefs. We
do not assume own-action independence. The assumption of ε being strictly
positive is due to two reasons: one mathematical and one conceptual. Mathe-
matically, by considering players’ spaces which involve finitely additive measures
λ, one can show that self-confirming equilibria might fail to exist (Example 1).
Conceptually, we take the point of view of Kalai and Lehrer [17] and [18]: we
impose rational behavior on players, but allow for slightly inconsistent beliefs.
The latter assumption can be justified by interpreting the belief of each player
as the belief entertained after many rounds of play, so that learning yields ap-
proximately correct predictions about observables. At the limit, beliefs would
be perfectly consistent with observations, but before that they might be just
ε-consistent.
(ii) The issue of measurability in nonatomic economies and games has been raised
6In our specification, this would collaps to a Nash equilibrium.
7For a related concept and result see also Section 5 of Fudenberg and Kamada [13].
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and dealt with by several authors in the past. Khan and Sun [22] proposed to
replace the unit interval with the Lebesgue measure with a generic Loeb space.
In this way, players (resp., coalitions) are represented as hyperreals (resp., sets
of hyperreals). Their approach is mathematically very elegant, but very different
from ours. Ours is conceptually simpler: we simply remove any measurability
constraint by replacing the Borel σ-algebra with the power set. This comes at a
cost: the loss of countable additivity of λ. This not only complicates the technical
analysis, but generates a conceptual loss. In fact, in an independent paper, Khan,
Qiao, Rath, and Sun [19] show that the existence of Nash equilibria for any game
with players’ space (T, T , λ) is equivalent to the countable additivity of λ. Since
the existence of Nash equilibria cannot be guaranteed with mere finite additivity,
they study the existence of ε-Nash equilibria, thus overlapping our Corollary 2.
(iii) The issue of modelling the players’ space as a continuum or as a discrete space
has also been discussed by Al-Najjar [2], who considers as competing models
the continuum space [0, 1] versus a dense countable grid of [0, 1]. This paper
also shares some of the motivation coming from the Dubey-Shapley’s remark on
measurability (see Dubey and Shapley [11] as well as Khan and Sun [22]). Thus,
in trying to build a link between these two conceptually equivalent approaches
countable additivity is necessarily lost, as in our case. The main results of Al-
Najjar [2] show that, under suitable conditions, the two approaches to modelling
the players’ space, that is, a continuum versus a discrete dense grid, are equiv-
alent. In order to achieve this result, Al-Najjar shows that all his Nash-type
equilibria, for his class of discrete games, can be purified. Compared to our
work, Al-Najjar is not concerned with any other form of equilibrium other than
Nash equilibria. Moreover, he establishes the existence of a form of ε-equilibrium
for those discrete nonatomic games that arise as limits of proper sequences of
finite-players games. Example 2 shows that for our more general class of games
these ε-equilibria are not always guaranteed to exist.
We conclude by mentioning one more work. One of the important papers on
nonatomic games which introduces a novel approach is Mas-Colell [26]. His approach is
based on distributions of strategies,8 which allows for not considering strategy profiles.
In this way, issues of measurability can be partially overridden in the proofs. It is an
alternative framework which permits the discussion of players’ negligibility. In this
8This reformulation is connected to the distributional approach for Bayesian games with a con-
tinuum of types (see [26, Remarks 3 and 4]).
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framework though, Shapley’s observation would still apply and the assumption of
countable additivity still seems to be playing a major role. Finally, we are not aware
of refinements of and variations on this distributional concept of equilibrium.
Roadmap. In Sections 2 and 3, we formally introduce nonatomic players’ spaces,
nonatomic games with estimation feedback, and the definition of ε-estimated equilib-
rium whose existence is proven in Theorem 1. In Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, as a
by-product, we obtain the existence of self-confirming, Nash, peer-confirming, and
Berk–Nash ε-equilibria. Proofs are relegated to the appendices. In particular, in Ap-
pendix A.1, Lemma 1 generalizes Theorem 7 of Khan and Sun [21] which deals with
the set of distributions induced by all the selections of a correspondence. In Appendix
A.2, we provide a brief summary of how the main proofs are carried out and prove all
the results contained in the main text.
2 Nonatomic players’ spaces
A players’ space is a pair (T, λ) where T is a set of players and λ is a (finitely additive)
probability on the power set of T .9 When T = N, a fundamental class of probabilities
that are not countably additive are natural densities, that is, probabilities λ such that
λ (E) = lim
k→∞
|E ∩ {1, ..., k}|
k
whenever the limit exists. As is well known, there are many natural densities and all
of them satisfy the following property:
Strong continuity (Savage’s nonatomicity) For each ε > 0 there exists a finite
partition {F1, F2, ..., Fk} of T such that λ (Fi) < ε for all i = 1, ..., k.
Under strong continuity, any singleton (i.e., any single player) has measure 0 and
for each F ⊆ T and β ∈ (0, 1) there exists E ⊆ F such that λ (E) = βλ (F ).10 This
is the class of probabilities introduced by Savage [31] when he solved De Finetti’s
open problem on the representation of qualitative probabilities (see also Samet and
Schmeidler [30]).
9Recall that λ is a finitely additive probability if and only if λ is a positive finitely additive set
function such that λ (T ) = 1.
10See Maharam [25, Example 2.1 and Theorem 2] and Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [7, Theorem
5.1.6 and Remark 5.1.7]. In this literature, natural densities are called density measures or density
charges.
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3 Nonatomic games and their equilibria
Nonatomic games are games where each single player has no influence on the strategic
interaction, but only the aggregate behavior of “large” sets of players can change
the players’ payoffs. Formally, a nonatomic (anonymous) game is a triplet G =
((T, λ) , A, u) where (T, λ) is the players’ space, A is the space of players’ actions/strategies
and u is their profile of utilities.11 Below, we discuss in detail these mathematical ob-
jects and their interpretations.
• A = {1, ..., n} is the set of pure strategies/actions.
• ∆ = {x ∈ Rn+ |∑ni=1 xi = 1} is the n−1 dimensional simplex. We denote by d∆
the distance on ∆ induced by the Euclidean norm. This set represents all possible
distributions of players’ strategies. Note that an element in ∆ can actually take
two possible interpretations. In fact, given a player t and an element of ∆, this
element can either be interpreted as a subjective belief of player t (in this case,
we often denote it by βt) or be interpreted as an objective distribution of players’
strategies (in this case, we typically denote it by x).
• u = (ut)t∈T is a profile of functions ut : A ×∆ → R. For each t in T , ut (a, βt)
represents the ex-ante utility of player t, when he chooses strategy a, if his belief
about the distribution of opponents’ strategies is βt.
As mentioned in the Introduction, nonatomic games were first studied by Schmei-
dler [32]. In this paper, we consider a class of games which we term nonatomic games
with estimation feedback. It has a richer structure and nonatomic games can be seen
as a specific parametrization.
Formally, a nonatomic game with estimation feedback is a quintet G = ((T, λ), A, u, (Π, pi), f)
where ((T, λ) , A, u) is a nonatomic game defined as above, (Π, pi) is a neighborhood
structure, and f is a profile of estimation feedback functions which discipline the be-
liefs’ formation of agents in equilibrium. Formally, we have that:
• (Π, pi) is a neighborhood structure if and only if Π = {Tj}mj=1 is a finite cover of
T whose elements have strictly positive measure and pi is a function from T to
{1, ..., m}. In particular, each Tj is a nonempty subset of T such that λ (Tj) > 0
11In the paper, given a generic set B, we use the term profile to refer to a function from the set of
players T to B. We will denote a profile by either b : T → B or by b = (bt)t∈T . The latter notation
will allow us, with a small abuse, to treat (bt)t∈T also as a set.
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and ∪mj=1Tj = T . An important example of finite covers are finite partitions of
the players’ space. We interpret an element of Π, Tj, as the j-th subpopulation
of T and for each t ∈ T the value pi (t) will denote which subpopulation player t
observes.12
• f = (ft)t∈T is a profile of (estimation) feedback functions ft : A×∆×∆ → [0,∞).
Each ft is assumed to be such that for each y ∈ ∆ there exists xy ∈ ∆ for which
it holds that
ft (a, xy, y) = 0 ∀a ∈ A (1)
For each t in T , ft (a, βt, x) represents a measure of consistency between the belief
βt (entertained by player t) about the players’ actions within the subpopulation
observed by t and the actual distribution of players’ strategies x within that
same subpopulation, with the idea that the larger ft (a, βt, x) is the greater is
the discrepancy between the player’s belief and the subpopulation actions’ distri-
bution. In line with this interpretation, property (1) says that for each possible
true model x there exists a belief βt such that this discrepancy is minimal, no
matter what action a is chosen by player t. To better understand (1), we next
state a stronger property which implies (1) and has a more immediate interpre-
tation. In all our specifications, with the exception of (11), it will be satisfied:
for each t ∈ T and for each a ∈ A
x = y =⇒ ft (a, x, y) = 0 (2)
In words, this latter property says that discrepancy is minimal provided the belief
βt is indeed correct, that is βt = x.
13 Under (1) or (2), we deliberately allow for
the possibility that ft (a, βt, x) = 0, but βt 6= x: a belief might be consistent with
evidence, but still incorrect.
Finally, we need three extra mathematical objects:
• Σ = AT is the set of all functions σ from T to A. Each σ ∈ Σ represents a
strategy profile in which the generic player t chooses strategy σ (t).
12Despite being a natural requirement, we can dispense with the assumption that t ∈ Tpi(t). In
other words, we do not need to assume that any player t belongs to the subpopulation he observes.
13Note that (2) implies (1). Fix t ∈ T . For each y ∈ ∆, set xy = y. By (2), it follows that
ft (a, xy, y) = 0 for all a ∈ A.
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• Given j ∈ {1, ..., m}, λj denotes the probability on the power set of T defined
by
λj (E) =
λ (E ∩ Tj)
λ (Tj)
∀E ⊆ T
In other words, λj is the players’ conditional measure in the subpopulation j.
Note that if λ is strongly continuous, so is each λj.
• Given σ ∈ Σ and j ∈ {1, ..., m}, λjσ ∈ ∆ is the distribution of σ on A in the j-th
subpopulation, that is,
λjσ =
(
λj ({t ∈ Tj | σ(t) = a})
)
a∈A
The vector λjσ represents the true distribution of players’ pure strategies in the
j-th subpopulation,14 when they all play according to σ. When Π is trivial, that
is, Π = {T}, then Π contains only one element and λ = λ1. In this case, we
write λσ in place of λ
1
σ. Similarly, the vector λσ represents the true distribution
of players’ pure strategies in the entire population.
We can now introduce our most general concept of equilibrium. It provides a
unifying structure for the notions of equilibrium that feature players best responding to
beliefs that are possibly wrong, but are nonetheless consistent with their probabilistic
information. In the next three sections, we discuss three particular and important
specifications (see also the Introduction).
Definition 1 Let ε ≥ 0. An ε-estimated equilibrium (in pure strategies) for the
nonatomic game with estimation feedback G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f) is a strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ such that there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T satisfying
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Aft (σ (t) , β (t) , λpi(t)σ ) ≤ ε
})
= 1 (3)
We are ready to state our main result.
14By definition of λjσ , note that
λjσ =
(
λj ({t ∈ T | σ(t) = a}))
a∈A
for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}.
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Theorem 1 Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f) be a nonatomic game with estimation
feedback and ε > 0. If λ is strongly continuous and f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions
which is equicontinuous with respect to the third argument,15 then G has an ε-estimated
equilibrium.
Remark 1 Three observations are in order:
1. In proving Theorem 1, we actually show that there exists an ε-estimated equi-
librium in which each player best-responds to his ε-discrepant belief (cf. also
Remark 4 and Lemma 3), that is, the set in (3) coincides with T and, in partic-
ular, has measure 1.
2. As just mentioned, in an ε-estimated equilibrium players best-respond to their
ε-discrepant beliefs. Mimicking the notion of rationalizable self-confirming equi-
librium of Rubinstein and Wolinsky [29], we could also require that this is cor-
rectly and commonly believed by all players. This will turn out to be useful in
discussing peer-confirming equilibrium (see Section 3.2). In order to do so, we
first introduce some notation and then propose a recursive definition. Given a
nonempty subset S ⊆ Σ, we denote by ∆ (S) the set of all probabilities over the
power set of S. Consider a player t ∈ T . An element β˜t ∈ ∆(S) represents the
belief of the player about which strategy profile in S will realize. At the same
time, given our assumption of anonymity and the neighborhood structure, what
is relevant for t is merely the distribution of players’ strategies β¯t, induced by
β˜t, within the subpopulation observed.
16 With this, given δ, ε ≥ 0, we can define
recursively the following sequence of sets {Sk}k∈N0: S0 = Σ and
Sk+1 =
{
σ ∈ Sk |∃β˜ ∈ ∆(Sk)T s.t. ∀t ∈ T
ut
(
σ (t) , β¯ (t)
) ≥ ut (a, β¯ (t))− δ ∀a ∈ A
ft
(
σ (t) , β¯ (t) , λ
pi(t)
σ
)
≤ ε
}
15We say that f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the third
argument if and only if for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ |ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
In other words, the family of functions {ft (a, γ, ·)}t∈T,a∈A,γ∈∆ from ∆ to [0,∞) is equicontinuous.
16Formally, we have that
β¯t =
(∫
S
λpi(t)
({
t ∈ Tpi(t) | σ(t) = a
})
dβ˜t
)
a∈A
or, more succinctly, β¯t =
∫
S
λ
pi(t)
σ dβ˜t.
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We say that σ ∈ Σ is a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium (in pure strate-
gies) for the nonatomic game with estimation feedbackG = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f)
if and only if σ ∈ ∩k∈N0Sk. In words, in a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equi-
librium, players δ-best-respond to their ε-discrepant beliefs and this is correctly
and commonly believed by all players. By setting ε = δ = 0, our definition
reduces to a version for nonatomic anonymous games of the equilibrium notion
of Rubinstein and Wolinsky [29]. We discuss existence in the next point.
3. Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f) be a nonatomic game with estimation feedback,
δ > 0, and ε ≥ 0. If λ is strongly continuous, u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions
which is equicontinuous with respect to the second argument,17 and each ft
satisfies condition (2), then G has a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium.18
N
3.1 Self-confirming and Nash equilibria
An interesting class of nonatomic games with estimation feedback arises when the
feedback function of player t is generated by a message function mt : A × ∆ → M ,
where M is a metric space with distance d.19 For each t in T , mt (a, x) represents the
message player t receives when he chooses strategy a and the distribution of players’
strategies is x. In games with finitely many players, typically the message function
17We say that u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the
second argument if and only if for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ |ut (a, x)− ut (a, y)| < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A
18In light of point 1 and, given the equicontinuity of u (cf. the proof of Corollary 2), we can prove
that there exists a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ such that
ut
(
σ (t) , λpi(t)σ
)
≥ ut
(
a, λpi(t)σ
)
− δ ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T
Set β˜ ∈ ∆(S0)T = ∆(Σ)T to be such that β˜ (t) coincides with the Dirac at σ for all t ∈ T . It follows
that β¯ (t) = λ
pi(t)
σ for all t ∈ T . Given that each ft satisfies (2), we have that ft
(
σ (t) , β¯ (t) , λ
pi(t)
σ
)
=
0 ≤ ε for all t ∈ T . This yields that σ ∈ S1. By induction, we can conclude that σ ∈ Sk for all k ∈ N0,
proving that σ is a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium. The complete proof is available upon
request.
19To simplify notation, we assume that the message space is the same for all players. This is
without loss of generality. We could have equivalently assumed that each player has his own message
spaceMt, and in the proofs embed this set into a larger common message spaceM . Our assumptions
of equicontinuity on the message functions mt (cf. Corollary 1) would seamlessly pass through the
embedding as well.
13
mt depends on the action chosen by the player and the profile of actions chosen by
the opponents. Nevertheless, given our underlying assumption of anonymity, it seems
natural to replace the latter with the actions’ distribution in the population.
With this in mind, the next type of equilibrium models a situation in which the
belief βt adopted by each agent t in equilibrium is consistent/confirmed with/by the
message received. More formally, βt is such that the expected message mt (σ (t) , βt)
is ε-close to the received message mt (σ (t) , λσ).
We define a nonatomic game with message feedback to be a quartetG = ((T, λ) , A, u,m)
where ((T, λ) , A, u) is a nonatomic game and m = (mt)t∈T is a profile of message
functions. Note that a nonatomic game with message feedback can be mapped into a
nonatomic game with estimation feedback. In fact, it is enough to consider (Π, pi) to
be trivial, that is Π = {T}, and set the profile of feedback functions to be such that:20
ft (a, x, y) = d (mt (a, x) , mt (a, y)) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x, y ∈ ∆ (4)
It can be seen immediately that each ft satisfies (2), and thus (1). We can define our
concept of self-confirming ε-equilibrium which we discuss below.
Definition 2 Let ε ≥ 0. A self-confirming ε-equilibrium (in pure strategies) for the
nonatomic game with message feedback G = ((T, λ) , A, u,m) is a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ
such that there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T satisfying
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad (mt (σ (t) , β (t)) , mt (σ (t) , λσ)) ≤ ε
})
= 1 (5)
In words, a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a self-confirming ε-equilibrium (ε-SCE) if and
only if
1. Almost all players best-respond to their beliefs (optimality);
2. Beliefs are not significantly refuted by what they can observe (ε-confirmation).
As noted in the Introduction, self-confirming equilibria were introduced for games
with finitely many players by Battigalli [6] and Fudenberg and Levine [14], and also
ε-confirmation was introduced by Battigalli [6] and Kalai and Lehrer [17] and [18]. To
the best of our knowledge, the above definition of ε-equilibrium seems to be novel for
nonatomic games and also natural (cf. the related literature section). Furthermore,
20In this case, note that pi can only take one value.
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it encompasses the notions of self-confirming equilibrium and ε-Nash equilibrium (a
fortiori, Nash equilibrium). To see this, we begin by observing that if ε = 0 and
mt : A×∆→ ∆ is such that
mt (a, x) = x ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ ∆ (6)
that is, (M, d) = (∆, d∆) and feedback is (statistically) perfect, then (5) becomes
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ) ∀a ∈ A}) = 1
which means that σ is a Nash equilibrium. In this case, beliefs are not only per-
fectly consistent with observations but also correct. Maintaining the perfect feedback
assumption (6), but allowing for ε > 0, (5) becomes
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , λσ) ≤ ε
})
= 1
Under a suitable assumption of continuity of u (see Corollary 2 and its proof), we can
show that σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium for some suitable εˆ > 0, that is,
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− εˆ ∀a ∈ A}) = 1
The intuition is simple: if beliefs are “close” to the true distribution, players are not
far from objective maximization.
Finally, if we remove perfect feedback but maintain ε = 0, (5) becomes
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Amt (σ (t) , β (t)) = mt (σ (t) , λσ)
})
= 1
which is arguably the nonatomic anonymous games counterpart of the definition of
self-confirming equilibrium (SCE).
Starting with ε-estimated equilibria, most of our analysis deals with the case in
which ε > 0. There are two reasons why we do so. First, conceptually, ε > 0 allows
beliefs to be only imperfectly confirmed, mirroring the fact that players’ observations
might be noisy and learning slow. Second, self-confirming equilibria and Nash equilib-
ria might not exist, as the following examples show. In a nutshell, Example 1 provides
an instance where Nash and SCE equilibria do not exist, but their ε-versions do. Ex-
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ample 2 provides an instance where ε-uniform Nash equilibria a` la Al-Najjar [2] do
not exist, but standard ε-Nash equilibria do.
Example 1 The next example builds on Khan, Qiao, Rath, and Sun [19].21 Consider
T = N and let λ be a natural density. Consider two strategies, that is, A = {1, 2}.
Assume that for each t ∈ T
ut (a, x) =
{
1
t
− x1 a = 1
x1 − 1t a = 2
∀x ∈ ∆
Let mt = ut for all t ∈ T . This amounts to the standard assumption of mere payoff
observability. Assume that σ ∈ Σ is an SCE, that is, there exists β ∈ ∆T such that
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) = ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ A}) = 1
For ease of notation, set λσ = x and define the set of “optimizing” players by
O = {t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) = ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ A}
We have two cases:
1. x1 > 0. Since λ is a natural density and O has mass 1, then O is infinite. Thus,
there exists t¯ ∈ N such that 2
t
− x1 < 0 for all t ∈ O ∩ {1, ..., t¯}c. Consider
t ∈ O ∩ {1, ..., t¯}c 6= ∅. By contradiction, assume that σ (t) = 1. The SCE
conditions imply that
1
t
− x1 = 1
t
− β (t)1 ≥ β (t)1 −
1
t
yielding that 0 ≤ β (t)1 ≤ 2t − x1 < 0, a contradiction. Since t was arbitrarily
chosen in O∩{1, ..., t¯}c, it follows that σ (t) = 2 for all t ∈ O∩{1, ..., t¯}c. Since λ is
a natural density and O and O∩{1, ..., t¯}c differ by a finite set λ (O ∩ {1, ..., t¯}c) =
1, we have that λσ = x is such that x2 = 1, a contradiction with 0 = 1 − x2 =
x1 > 0.
2. x1 = 0. Consider t ∈ O. By contradiction, assume that σ (t) = 2. The SCE
21The example of Khan, Qiao, Rath, and Sun [19] seems to be the first one in the literature to
exhibit a well-behaved nonatomic game which does not have any Nash equilibrium, be it pure or
mixed.
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conditions imply that
x1 − 1
t
= β (t)1 −
1
t
≥ 1
t
− β (t)1
yielding that 0 = x1 = β (t)1 and 0 ≥ 2t > 0, a contradiction. Since t was
arbitrarily chosen in O, σ (t) = 1 for all t ∈ O, yielding that λσ = x is such that
x1 = 1, a contradiction with x1 = 0.
To sum up, we have just shown that the nonatomic game with message feedback
above does not have any self-confirming equilibrium and, in particular, any Nash
equilibrium.22 This happens despite the fact that the profile of message functions is
extremely well-behaved being m = (mt)t∈T equicontinuous with respect to the second
argument (cf. Corollary 1).23 At the same time, consider ε > 0. Let t¯ ∈ N be such
that min {1, ε} > 1
t
for all t ∈ N such that t > t¯. Set ε¯ = min {1, ε}. Consider a
strategy profile σ ∈ Σ and a belief profile β ∈ ∆T such that σ (t) = 2 and β (t)1 =
ε¯+ 1
t
2
∈ (1
t
, ε¯
) ⊆ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N such that t > t¯. Since {1, ..., t¯} is finite and λ is a
natural density, we have that λσ = x is such that x2 = 1, that is, x1 = 0. It follows
that for each t ∈ {1, ..., t¯}c
|mt (σ (t) , β (t))−mt (σ (t) , λσ)| =
∣∣∣∣ ε¯+ 1t2 − 1t − x1 + 1t
∣∣∣∣ = ε¯+ 1t2 < ε¯ ≤ ε
and
ut (σ (t) , β (t)) = β (t)1 −
1
t
=
ε¯− 1
t
2
> 0 >
1
t
− β (t)1 = ut (1, β (t))
22Two extra observations are in order:
a. In the nonatomic game above, SCE equilibria and Nash equilibria coincide. This is by chance,
as the next point shows.
b. Khan, Qiao, Rath, and Sun [19] consider T = N and let λ be a natural density. They assume
A = {1, 2} and uˆ to be such that for each t ∈ T
uˆt (a, x) =
{
1
t
− x1 a = 1
0 a = 2
∀x ∈ ∆
With similar arguments, they prove that the nonatomic game ((T, λ) , A, uˆ) does not have any Nash
equilibrium. At the same time, if we consider the augmented nonatomic game with message feedback
((T, λ) , A, uˆ,m) where mt = uˆt for all t ∈ T , then we can show that there exists an SCE equilibrium.
In fact, if σ ∈ Σ is such that σ (t) = 2 for all t ∈ T , by setting β ∈ ∆T such that β (t)1 = 1 for all
t ∈ T , we obtain the result.
23Indeed, note that for each ε > 0 we can set δε = ε and get
d∆ (x, y) < ε =⇒ |mt (a, x)−mt (a, y)| = |x1 − y1| ≤ d∆ (x, y) < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A
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Since {1, ..., t¯}c has mass 1, we can conclude that σ ∈ Σ is an ε-SCE. N
Example 2 Al-Najjar [2] (cf. the Introduction) also deals with the lack of countable
additivity and studies the following equilibrium: a strategy σ ∈ Σ is an Al-Najjar
equilibrium (in pure strategies) if and only if for each ε > 0
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}) > 1− ε (7)
We next show that also these equilibria might fail to exist. In what follows, it will
often be useful to set
Oε = {t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}
Two observations are in order. First, compared to the ε-Nash equilibria we study
(Corollary 2), the key difference is that, in our case, σ might depend on the given ε,
while in Al-Najjar’s case, σ must work with any ε. In particular, one can easily show
that:24 σ ∈ Σ is an Al-Najjar equilibrium if and only if for each ε > 0
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}) = 1
Second, by taking the intersection of the sets O1/n, this allows us to conclude easily
that an Al-Najjar equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, provided λ is countably additive.
We consider the nonatomic game ((T, λ) , A, u˜) where (T, λ) and A are as in Example
1 and for each t ∈ T
u˜t (a, x) =

1
t
− x1 a = 1 and x1 > 0
x1 − 1t a = 2 and x1 > 0
1 a = 1 and x1 = 0
1
t
a = 2 and x1 = 0
∀x ∈ ∆
Assume that σ ∈ Σ satisfies (7). For ease of notation, set λσ = x. As before, we have
two cases:
1. x1 > 0. Fix ε > 0. Since λ is a natural density, the set Oε has mass 1, and
λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1}) > 0, we have that Oε∩{t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1} is infinite. Since
24It is easy to see that if 0 < ε < ε′, then Oε ⊆ Oε′ , thus
λ (Oε′ ) ≥ λ (Oε) > 1− ε ∀ε′ > 0, ∀ε ∈ (0, ε′)
yielding that λ (Oε′) = 1 for all ε
′ > 0.
18
ε was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that we can construct a strictly increasing
sequence {tk}k∈N ⊆ N such that tk ∈ O1/k ∩ {t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1} for all k ∈ N.
Since tk ∈ O1/k, σ (tk) = 1, and x1 > 0, we have that for each k ∈ N
1
tk
− x1 ≥ x1 − 1
tk
− 1
k
=⇒ 0 < x1 ≤ 1
tk
+
1
2k
By passing to the limit, we obtain that 0 < x1 ≤ 0, a contradiction.
2. x1 = 0. Fix ε > 0. Since λ is a natural density, the set Oε has mass 1, and
λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 2}) > 0, we have that Oε∩{t ∈ T | σ (t) = 2} is infinite. Since
ε was arbitrarily chosen, this implies that we can construct a strictly increasing
sequence {tk}k∈N ⊆ N such that tk ∈ O1/k ∩ {t ∈ T | σ (t) = 2} for all k ∈ N.
Since tk ∈ O1/k, σ (tk) = 2, and x1 = 0, we have that for each k ∈ N
1
tk
≥ 1− 1
k
By passing to the limit, we obtain that 0 ≥ 1, a contradiction.
To sum up, we have just shown that the nonatomic game ((T, λ) , A, u˜) does not have
any equilibrium as defined in (7). At the same time, it is not hard to see that this
game admits an ε-Nash equilibrium for every ε > 0. One way to observe this is
to consider the augmented game ((T, λ) , A, u˜,m) in which each player has perfect
statistical feedback: that is
mt (a, x) = x ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ ∆
Since m = (mt)t∈T is equicontinuous with respect to the second argument (cf. Corol-
lary 1), we have that for each ε > 0 there exists an ε-SCE. Given ε ∈ (0, 1),
it can immediately be proved that a strategy profile σ is an ε-SCE if and only if
λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1}) ∈ [0, ε/√2]. Given our choice of m, following the intuition
that “if beliefs are close to the true distribution, players are not far from objec-
tive maximization”, we can prove that, given ε ∈ (0, 1), if σ is an ε
2
√
2
-SCE and
λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1}) > 0, then σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium. In other words, ((T, λ) , A, u˜)
does not have any equilibrium as defined in (7), but for each ε > 0 it has an ε-Nash
equilibrium.25 N
25Since λ is strongly continuous, note that, given ε ∈ (0, 1), we can always find σ ∈ Σ such that
λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1}) ∈ (0, ε/4]. In other words, in light of the above characterization, we can always
find a strategy profile σ which is an ε
2
√
2
-SCE such that λ ({t ∈ T | σ (t) = 1}) > 0.
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We are ready to state the main results of this section.
Corollary 1 Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u,m) be a nonatomic game with message feedback
and ε > 0. If λ is strongly continuous and m = (mt)t∈T is a family of functions which
is equicontinuous with respect to the second argument,26 then G has an ε-SCE.
In particular, under the assumption of payoff observability, that is, mt (a, x) =
ut (a, x) for all t ∈ T, a ∈ A, x ∈ ∆, Corollary 1 yields that if λ is strongly continuous
and u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the
second argument, then there exists an ε-SCE strategy profile σ ∈ Σ such that
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ A|ut (σ (t) , β (t))− ut (σ (t) , λσ)| ≤ ε
})
= 1
where β ∈ ∆T . In this case, the objective observed payoff substantially matches the
expected one. Building on Corollary 1 and following a similar intuition, we also obtain
the existence of ε-Nash equilibria.
Corollary 2 Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u) be a nonatomic game and ε > 0. If λ is strongly
continuous and u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with
respect to the second argument,27 then G has an ε-Nash equilibrium, that is, there
exists a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ such that
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}) = 1
At this point, the reader might wonder how restrictive are our assumptions of
equicontinuity.28 At first sight, it might appear that the degree of similarity among
players, imposed by a measurable structure as in the original framework of Schmeidler,
is here replaced by equicontinuity. The following example should clarify that this is
far from being the case.
26We say that m = (mt)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the
second argument if and only if for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ d (mt (a, x) ,mt (a, y)) < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A
27See Footnote 17.
28See also the discussion following Corollary 3.
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Example 3 Assume that players have expected-utility like preferences, namely, for
each t ∈ T
ut (a, x) =
∑
b∈A
vt (a, b) xb ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ ∆
where vt : A × A → R. As is well known, each vt can be normalized to be taking
values in [0, 1], without altering the player’s preferences. In light of this, an immediate
application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields that
|ut (a, x)− ut (a, y)| ≤
√
nd∆ (x, y) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A
proving that u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect
to the second argument. Thus, preferences can be extremely different within the above
class and yet satisfy equicontinuity. N
As mentioned in the Introduction, Khan, Qiao, Rath, and Sun [19] showed that in
the absence of countable additivity the existence of Nash equilibria is not guaranteed.
They also reported an independent result of existence of an ε-Nash equilibrium. Their
definition is weaker than ours. In their case, a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is an ε-equilibrium
if and only if
λ ({t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}) ≥ 1− ε
3.2 Peer-confirming equilibria
Lipnowski and Sadler [24] propose a notion of equilibrium in which players best-
respond to beliefs which are required to be correct only when it comes to the behavior
of opponents who belong to the same neighborhood. Moreover, they further require
that this is correctly and commonly believed by players. Formally, the collection of
neighborhoods is a partition of the players in terms of the connected components of
an underlying undirected network. They study games with finitely many players. For
simultaneous-move games, peer-confirming equilibrium is an example of rationalizable
self-confirming equilibrium (see also Rubinstein and Wolinsky [29] as well as Fudenberg
and Kamada [13]). In what follows, we dispense with the assumption of correct and
common belief. This seems reasonable since nonatomic anonymous games model ex-
actly situations where individuals are negligible and are not fully aware of the strategic
environment surrounding them, rendering sophisticated strategic reasoning less plausi-
ble. At the same time, our notion of rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium allows
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us to offer a more faithful translation to our setting of peer-confirming equilibrium
(see Remark 2). Moreover, given anonymity we require that players’ observations are
only about the actions’ distributions in the subpopulation they face.
We define a nonatomic game with a neighborhood structure to be a quartet G =
((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi)) where ((T, λ) , A, u) is a nonatomic game and (Π, pi) is a neigh-
borhood structure. Note that a nonatomic game with a neighborhood structure can be
mapped into a nonatomic game with estimation feedback. In fact, it is enough to set
the profile of feedback functions to be such that
ft (a, x, y) = d∆ (x, y) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x, y ∈ ∆ (8)
It can be seen immediately that each ft satisfies (2), and thus (1). We can define the
version of peer-confirming ε-equilibrium that we analyze below.
Definition 3 Let ε ≥ 0. A peer-confirming ε-equilibrium (in pure strategies) for the
nonatomic game with a neighborhood structure G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi)) is a strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ such that there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T satisfying
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , λpi(t)σ ) ≤ ε
})
= 1 (9)
In words, a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a peer-confirming ε-equilibrium (ε-PCE) if
and only if
1. Almost all players best-respond to their beliefs (optimality);
2. Beliefs are almost correct in terms of the subpopulation observed (ε-neighborhood
confirmation).
Corollary 3 Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi)) be a nonatomic game with a neighborhood
structure and ε > 0. If λ is strongly continuous, then G has an ε-PCE.
It is important to note how the corollary above does not require any extra prop-
erty of continuity. For, in such a case feedback is perfect, when restricted to each
subpopulation, and action independent, automatically satisfying the requirement of
equicontinuity in Theorem 1. Conceptually, this confirms that, in contrast with mea-
surability assumptions, our properties of equicontinuity do not impose automatically
that “close players” have similar preferences/behavior (cf. Example 3).
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Remark 2 Two observations are in order:
1. In the definition of ε-PCE, we could allow for the possibility that each player t
has a belief β˜t over the entire space of players’ strategy profiles Σ (cf. point 2 of
Remark 1) and require that only the restriction to the subpopulation observed,
in terms of actions’ distribution, that is β¯t, is ε-confirmed. This would allow for
modelling explicitly the possibility that players, in equilibrium, possibly entertain
wrong beliefs about players not in their neighborhood. Given our nonatomic
structure and Corollary 3, we could obtain an existence result also for this more
general notion.
2. Consider a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium as defined in point 2 of Re-
mark 1 where the profile of feedback functions is set to be as in (8). Given this
specification, in a rationalizable (δ, ε)-estimated equilibrium, all players δ-best-
respond to their beliefs which are almost correct in terms of the subpopulation
observed. Moreover, this is correctly and commonly believed by all players. By
setting ε = δ = 0, our definition provides a more faithful formal translation
to nonatomic anonymous games of the equilibrium notion studied by Lipnowski
and Sadler [24]. By point 3 of Remark 1, given a nonatomic game with a neigh-
borhood structure G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi)) as well as δ > 0 and ε ≥ 0, if λ is
strongly continuous and u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicon-
tinuous with respect to the second argument, then G has a rationalizable (δ, ε)-
estimated equilibrium. N
3.3 Berk–Nash equilibria
Esponda and Pouzo [12] propose a notion of equilibrium that allows for players’ beliefs
to be possibly misspecified (see also Remark 3 below). It is a different way, compared
to self-confirming equilibria, to allow for potentially incorrect beliefs in equilibrium.
They term their notion of equilibrium Berk–Nash. Berk–Nash equilibria are based
on the assumption that each player has a set of probabilistic models over the payoff-
relevant features, in our case {Qt}t∈T ⊆ ∆o,29 and:
1. All players best-respond to their beliefs (optimality);
29As usual, ∆o denotes the set
{x ∈ ∆ | xi > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}}
In other words, ∆o is the relative interior of ∆.
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2. Each player’s belief is restricted to be the best fit (in terms of Kullback–Leibler
distance) among the set of beliefs he considers possible.
In our setup, this would mean that each player t has a (possibly misspecified) set
of models Qt ⊆ ∆o. A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Berk–Nash equilibrium if and only if
there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T such that the set of all players that satisfy the
following two conditions has full measure:30
1. ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A;
2. β (t) ∈ argminz∈Qt K (λσ||z) (where K is the Kullback–Leibler distance).
In what follows, we offer a more general version for nonatomic games of the above
equilibrium. In order to do so, we define a nonatomic game with model misspecification
to be a quintet G = ((T, λ) , A, u,Q, D) where
a. ((T, λ) , A, u) is a nonatomic game;
b. Q = (Qt)t∈T is a profile of sets of actions’ distributions, that is, Qt is a nonempty,
compact, and convex subset of ∆o for all t ∈ T ;
c. D : ∆ × ∆o → [0,∞) is a statistical divergence, that is, a jointly convex and
continuous function such that for each x, y ∈ ∆o
x = y ⇐⇒ D (x||y) = 0. (10)
The next example describes a class of widely used statistical divergences.
Example 4 The most classic statistical divergences are φ-divergences which have the
form
Dφ (x||z) =
n∑
i=1
ziφ
(
xi
zi
)
where φ is a positive, continuous, strictly convex function on R+ such that φ (1) = 0.
For example, for φ (s) = s log s − s + 1,31 Dφ is the Kullback–Leibler distance, for
φ (s) = (s− 1)2 /2,Dφ is the χ2-distance, and for φ (s) = (
√
s− 1)2, Dφ is the Hellinger
distance. In all these specifications, Dφ satisfies (10) and it is jointly convex and
continuous. N
30Compared to Esponda and Pouzo [12], we do not assume that players’ are expected utility and
have a prior µ over argminz∈Qt K (λσ||z). In other words, players are only allowed to consider
degenerate priors. A priori, this makes it more difficult to obtain an existence result. Moreover, we
are also not considering any extra form of feedback (see point 1 of Remark 3 below).
31Here, it is assumed implicitly that φ (0) = 1 which is obtained by taking the limit for s→ 0.
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Note that a nonatomic game with model misspecification can be mapped into a
nonatomic game with estimation feedback. In fact, it is enough to consider (Π, pi) to
be trivial, that is Π = {T}, and set the profile of feedback functions to be such that:32
ft (a, x, y) = d∆
(
x, argminz∈Qt D (y||z)
) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x, y ∈ ∆ (11)
It is not hard to show that each ft satisfies (1), but might fail to satisfy (2). We can
define our version of Berk–Nash ε-equilibrium which we discuss below.
Definition 4 Let ε ≥ 0. A Berk–Nash ε-equilibrium (in pure strategies) for the
nonatomic game with model misspecification G = ((T, λ) , A, u,Q, D) is a strategy
profile σ ∈ Σ such that there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T satisfying
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , argminz∈Qt D (λσ||z)) ≤ ε
})
= 1 (12)
Note that a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is a Berk–Nash ε-equilibrium (ε-BNE) if and
only if
1. Almost all players best-respond to their beliefs (optimality);
2. Beliefs are ε-close to the set of probabilistic models which are the best fit in the
primitive set Qt of the realized distribution (ε-fit).
Although prima facie they might appear similar, the notion of ε-BNE is concep-
tually and formally very different from that of ε-SCE.33 The next result proves that,
under suitable conditions, the former type of equilibria always exists. To do so, we
need a last piece of notation. Given δ > 0, we denote
∆δ = {x ∈ ∆ | xi ≥ δ ∀i ∈ {1, .., n}}
In words, ∆δ is the set of all actions’ distributions which are uniformly bounded away
from zero by δ.
32In this case, note that pi can only take one value. Moreover, when x ∈ ∆ and Y is a nonempty
subset of ∆, d∆ (x, Y ) denotes the distance of x from the set Y , that is,
d∆ (x, Y ) = inf
y∈Y
d∆ (x, y)
In our case, Y = argminz∈Qt D (y||z).
33The two equilibrium notions are distinct, but share some overlap (see Esponda and Pouzo [12]).
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Corollary 4 Let G = ((T, λ) , A, u,Q, D) be a nonatomic game with model misspec-
ification and ε > 0. If λ is strongly continuous, D is strictly convex in the second
argument, and there exists δ > 0 such that Qt ⊆ ∆δ for all t ∈ T , then G has an
ε-BNE.
Remark 3 Four observations are in order:
1. Unlike Esponda and Pouzo [12] original formulation, in our definition each
player’s set of actions’ distributions Qt does not depend on the action played.
Conceptually, this amounts to assume that there is perfect statistical feedback. If
we were to impose that eachQt was also function of the action, that is a 7→ Qt (a),
the feedback function in (11) would fail to satisfy property (1).
2. In Definition 4, we allow each player’s equilibrium belief β (t) to be possibly
outside the set Qt. This could be interpreted as allowing for the possibility that
each player fears model misspecification and willingly considers probability mod-
els that are outside his posited set Qt (see Cerreia-Vioglio, Hansen, Maccheroni,
and Marinacci [10]). At the same time, we could have considered the following
more stringent definition of ε-BNE where this is not allowed. In this case, σ ∈ Σ
would be an ε-BNE if and only if there exists a profile of beliefs β ∈ ∆T satisfying
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , argminz∈Qt D (λσ||z)) ≤ ε and β (t) ∈ Qt
})
= 1
Under the same exact assumptions of Corollary 4, we can show that also these
ε-equilibria exist.
3. Our results do not directly apply to the case in which D is the Kullback–Leibler
distance K. In fact, in this case, K (x||·) might fail to be strictly convex.34 At
the same time, any perturbation κ > 0 of a statistical divergence D, that is
D+κd2∆, is a statistical divergence and satisfies the condition of strict convexity
in Corollary 4.
4. The assumption “there exists δ > 0 such that Qt ⊆ ∆δ for all t ∈ T” is equivalent
to the condition “each Q that belongs to the Hausdorff distance closure of Q is
a subset of ∆o”. In other words, it is an assumption of relative compactness. N
34In fact, K (x||·) is strictly convex if x ∈ ∆o, but it might fail to be so if x ∈ ∆\∆o.
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A Appendix
In what follows, we first provide the proofs of the results in the main text and then
conclude with one of the authors explaining the origin of nonatomic games. We begin
with Appendix A.1 where we discuss a result which is key in proving Theorem 1.
Appendix A.2 contains the remaining proofs. In a nutshell, this latter section is divided
into two parts. First, we deal with the proof of existence of ε-estimated equilibria.
Second, we prove the existence of ε-SCE, ε-NE, ε-PCE, and ε-BNE by showing that
they are all particular cases or consequence of the existence of ε-estimated equilibria.
In the appendix, the vector space we use is the Cartesian product of m copies of
R
n, that is (Rn)m, where n is given by the cardinality of the space of actions A andm is
given by the cardinality of the neighborhood structure (Π, pi). We denote the elements
of (Rn)m by bold letters, that is x and y, while xj will be the vector in R
n which is
the j-th component of x. If m = 1, then we denote x and y simply by x and y. We
endow (Rn)m with the topology induced by the norm ‖x‖ = maxj∈{1,...,m} ‖xj‖2 where
‖ ‖2 is the Euclidean norm. Finally, we denote the Cartesian product of m copies of
∆ by ∆m. Note that ∆m is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of (Rn)m and we
endow it with the distance induced by ‖ ‖.
A.1 A key general result
The next lemma uses the terminology of Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [7]. Before
discussing it, we need a piece of notation which will turn out to be useful in our later
analysis. If T and A are two generic nonempty sets and Γ : T ⇒ A is a (nonempty
valued) correspondence, we denote by Sel (Γ) the set of all selections of Γ, that is, the
set of all functions γ : T → A such that γ (t) ∈ Γ (t) for all t ∈ T . Just for this
section, T is an arbitrary σ-algebra of subsets of T .35 Finally, given a T -measurable
map γ : T → A and a probability µ : T → [0, 1], recall that
µγ = (µ ({t ∈ T | γ(t) = a}))a∈A
Lemma 1 Let (T, T ) be a measurable space, A a finite set with n elements, and
λ = (λ1, ..., λm) a vector of strongly continuous probabilities on T . If Γ : T ⇒ A is a
correspondence, then{
λγ =
(
λ1γ, ..., λ
m
γ
) | γ ∈ Sel (Γ) and γ is T -measurable}
35In the rest of the paper, T is the power set.
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is a convex subset of ∆m.
Proof. If φ, γ ∈ Sel (Γ) and are T -measurable, for each α ∈ (0, 1), we want to
construct ψ ∈ Sel (Γ) which is T -measurable and such that λψ = αλφ + (1− α)λγ .
Set Sij = φ
−1 (i) ∩ γ−1 (j) for all i, j ∈ A. Then {Sij}i,j∈A forms a partition of
T (with possibly some empty elements) and all its elements belong to T , because
φ−1 (i) , γ−1 (j) ∈ T for all i, j ∈ A.
Since λ1, ..., λm are strongly continuous and T is a σ-algebra, for any i, j ∈ A,
there are Tij , Uij ∈ T such that Sij = Tij ⊔ Uij ,36 λ (Tij) = αλ (Sij), and λ (Uij) =
(1− α)λ (Sij). This is trivial if Sij is empty, else set
Tij = T ∩ Sij
λkij (S) = λ
k (S) ∀S ∈ Tij , ∀k = 1, ..., m
and notice that λ1ij, ..., λ
m
ij are strongly continuous, positive, and bounded charges on
the σ-algebra Tij . By Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao [7, Theorem 11.4.9], the set
R (λij) =
{(
λ1ij (S) , ..., λ
m
ij (S)
) | S ∈ Tij}
is convex in Rm. Moreover, both 0 =
(
λ1ij (∅) , ..., λ
m
ij (∅)
)
and λij (Sij) =
(
λ1ij (Sij) , ..., λ
m
ij (Sij)
)
belong to R (λij). By convexity of the latter, there exists Tij ∈ Tij such that λij (Tij) =
αλij (Sij). But then Tij, Uij = Sij \ Tij ∈ T , Sij = Tij ⊔ Uij , λ (Tij) = λij (Tij) =
αλij (Sij) = αλ (Sij), and λ (Uij) = (1− α)λ (Sij) by additivity of λ.
The function ψ : T → A defined by
ψ (t) =
{
φ (t) = i if t ∈ Tij
γ (t) = j if t ∈ Uij
is well defined and ψ (t) ∈ {φ (t) , γ (t)} ⊆ Γ (t) for all t ∈ T , so that ψ ∈ Sel (Γ). For
36⊔ denotes the disjoint union.
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each k ∈ A,
ψ−1 (k) = {t ∈ T | ψ (t) = k} =
{
t ∈
( ⊔
i,j∈A
Tij
)
⊔
( ⊔
i,j∈A
Uij
)
| ψ (t) = k
}
=
( ⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Tij | ψ (t) = k}
)
⊔
( ⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Uij | ψ (t) = k}
)
=
( ⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Tij | φ (t) = k}
)
⊔
( ⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Uij | γ (t) = k}
)
but, for all t ∈ Tij, φ (t) = i, then
• if i = k, {t ∈ Tij | φ (t) = k} = Tij ,
• else i 6= k and {t ∈ Tij | φ (t) = k} = ∅,
thus
⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Tij | φ (t) = k} =
⊔
i,j∈A|i=k
Tij =
⊔
j∈A
Tkj; analogously, for all t ∈ Uij ,
γ (t) = j; then
• if j = k, {t ∈ Uij | γ (t) = k} = Uij ,
• else j 6= k and {t ∈ Uij | γ (t) = k} = ∅,
thus
⊔
i,j∈A
{t ∈ Uij | γ (t) = k} =
⊔
i,j∈A|j=k
Uij =
⊔
i∈A
Uik; therefore,
ψ−1 (k) =
(⊔
j∈A
Tkj
)
⊔
(⊔
i∈A
Uik
)
∈ T
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As a consequence, ψ is T -measurable and, for each k ∈ A, and for each l = 1, ..., m,
λl
(
ψ−1 (k)
)
=
∑
j∈A
λl (Tkj) +
∑
i∈A
λl (Uik) =
∑
j∈A
αλl (Skj) +
∑
i∈A
(1− α)λl (Sik)
= αλl
(⊔
j∈A
Skj
)
+ (1− α)λl
(⊔
i∈A
Sik
)
= αλl
(⊔
j∈A
(
φ−1 (k) ∩ γ−1 (j)))+ (1− α)λl(⊔
i∈A
(
φ−1 (i) ∩ γ−1 (k)))
= αλl
(
φ−1 (k) ∩
⊔
j∈A
γ−1 (j)
)
+ (1− α)λl
(
γ−1 (k) ∩
⊔
i∈A
φ−1 (i)
)
= αλl
(
φ−1 (k) ∩ T )+ (1− α)λl (γ−1 (k) ∩ T )
= αλl
(
φ−1 (k)
)
+ (1− α) λl (γ−1 (k))
thus λlψ = αλ
l
φ + (1− α)λlγ . Since this is true for each l = 1, ..., m, then λψ =
αλφ + (1− α)λγ , as wanted. 
Building on this lemma, Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler [15] prove
that, when m = 1, {λγ | γ ∈ Sel (Γ) and γ is T -measurable} is indeed the core of the
belief function
Bel (I) = λ ({t ∈ T | Γ (t) ⊆ I}) ∀I ⊆ A
and they characterize its extreme points a` la Shapley [33].
A.2 Proofs and related material
In what follows and up to the proof of Corollary 1, we consider a nonatomic game
with estimation feedback G = ((T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f). Recall that Π is a collection
of nonempty subsets of T , {Tj}mj=1, such that λ (Tj) > 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., m} and
T = ∪mj=1Tj . The proof of existence of ε-estimated equilibria rests on two key ideas
which we formally develop below:
1. We first consider different correspondences and study their properties. This
study culminates with the correspondence B˜Rf,ε : ∆
m ⇒ ∆m defined in (14)
below. All of these correspondences are basically ε-consistent/confirmed best-
reply correspondences. To fix ideas, for the case Π = {T} and m = 1, in words,
given x ∈ ∆ and y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x), y is a possible distribution of strategies in the
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population, which arises if the players’ distribution of actions was x and players
best-responded to it using a belief which was ε-consistent with respect to x.
2. We then show that B˜Rf,ε has a fixed point by using Browder’s Fixed Point
Theorem. This will give us the equilibrium in pure strategies that we are after.
Consider ε > 0. First, let BRf,ε : T ×∆m ⇒ A be defined by
BRf,ε (t,x)
=
{
b ∈ A | ∃βt ∈ ∆ s.t. ft
(
b, βt, xpi(t)
)
< ε and ut (b, βt) ≥ ut (a, βt) ∀a ∈ A
}
for all (t,x) ∈ T × ∆m. Clearly, BRf,ε (t,x) is the set of all pure strategies which
are a best-reply of player t to some belief βt where βt is ε-consistent when assuming
the true distribution restricted to the subpopulation Tpi(t) is xpi(t). One can derive
several related “ε-consistent best-reply” correspondences from this basic one. For
each x ∈ ∆m, denote the x-section BRf,ε (·,x) : T ⇒ A of BRf,ε by BRxf,ε. Next, let
Φf,ε : ∆
m ⇒ Σ be defined as Φf,ε(x) = Sel
(
BRxf,ε
)
for all x ∈ ∆m where Sel (BRxf,ε)
is the set of all selections of BRxf,ε. Thus, for a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ, we have that
[σ ∈ Φf,ε (x)]
⇐⇒ [∀t ∈ T, σ(t) ∈ BRxf,ε (t)]
⇐⇒ [∀t ∈ T, σ(t) ∈ BRf,ε (t,x)]
⇐⇒ [∀t ∈ T ∃βt ∈ ∆ s.t. ft (σ (t) , βt, xpi(t)) < ε and ut (σ(t), βt) ≥ ut (a, βt) ∀a ∈ A]
Remark 4 If there exists x ∈ ∆m such that σ ∈ Φf,ε (x) and xpi(t) = λpi(t)σ for all
t ∈ T , then σ is an ε-estimated equilibrium. In fact, we have
1. For each t ∈ T there exists βt ∈ ∆ such that ft
(
σ (t) , βt, xpi(t)
)
< ε and
ut (σ(t), βt) ≥ ut (a, βt) for all a ∈ A;
2. We can define β : T → ∆ by β (t) = βt for all t ∈ T .
This implies that for each t ∈ T
a) ut (σ(t), β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A (optimality);
b) ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , λ
pi(t)
σ
)
< ε (strict ε-consistency),
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that is,
{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Aft (σ (t) , β (t) , λpi(t)σ ) < ε
}
= T . In particular, it
holds that
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Aft (σ (t) , β (t) , λpi(t)σ ) ≤ ε
})
= 1
N
Next, consider the correspondence Bf,ε : ∆
m ⇒ Σ defined by
Bf,ε (x) =
{
σ ∈ Σ | ∃β ∈ ∆T s.t. ut (σ(t), β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T
supt∈T ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t)
)
< ε
}
∀x ∈ ∆m
Lemma 2 Bf,ε (x) =
⋃
η∈(0,ε)Φf,η (x) ⊆ Φf,ε (x) for all x ∈ ∆m.
Proof. Fix x ∈ ∆m. Consider σ ∈ ⋃η∈(0,ε)Φf,η (x). It follows that σ ∈ Φf,η (x)
for some η ∈ (0, ε). This implies that σ ∈ Σ and σ (t) ∈ BRf,η(t,x) for all t ∈ T ,
that is, for each t ∈ T there exists βt ∈ ∆ such that ft
(
σ (t) , βt, xpi(t)
)
< η and
ut (σ(t), βt) ≥ ut (a, βt) for all a ∈ A. In particular, if we define β ∈ ∆T as β (t) = βt
for all t ∈ T , we have that ut (σ(t), β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A and for all t ∈ T ,
and
sup
t∈T
ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t)
) ≤ η < ε
yielding that σ ∈ Bf,ε (x). Conversely, if σ ∈ Bf,ε (x), then there exists β ∈ ∆T such
that
sup
t∈T
ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t)
)
< ε (13)
and ut (σ(t), β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A and for all t ∈ T . It follows that
there exists η¯ ∈ (0, ε) such that (13) holds with η¯ in place of ε. This implies that
σ ∈ Φf,η¯ (x) ⊆
⋃
η∈(0,ε)Φf,η (x).
Obviously, if 0 < η < η′, then BRf,η (t,x) ⊆ BRf,η′ (t,x) for all t ∈ T and for all
x ∈ ∆m and, in particular, Φf,η (x) ⊆ Φf,η′ (x). This implies that
⋃
η∈(0,ε)Φf,η (x) ⊆
Φf,ε (x). 
Remark 4 above will be useful to justify the following last correspondence: B˜Rf,ε :
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∆m ⇒ ∆m defined by
B˜Rf,ε (x) =
{
y ∈ ∆m | ∃σ ∈ Bf,ε (x) s.t. λjσ = yj ∀j ∈ {1, ..., m}
} ∀x ∈ ∆m
(14)
In other words, B˜Rf,ε (x) is the collection of actions’ distributions y = (yj)
m
j=1 on the
subpopulations of players, which can be induced by the β-optimal choice of strategies
σ where beliefs β = (βt)t∈T are close enough in terms of feedback to x = (xj)
m
j=1. Note
that
B˜Rf,ε (x) =
{(
λjσ
)m
j=1
| σ ∈ Bf,ε (x)
}
=
(λjσ)mj=1 | σ ∈ ⋃
η∈(0,ε)
Φf,η (x)
 (15)
=
⋃
η∈(0,ε)
{(
λjσ
)m
j=1
| σ ∈ Φf,η (x)
}
=
⋃
η∈(0,ε)
{(
λjσ
)m
j=1
| σ ∈ Sel (BRxf,η)}
(16)
An immediate implication of the definition in (14) is the next result.
Lemma 3 If x ∈ B˜Rf,ε(x), then there exists an ε-estimated equilibrium σ such that
λjσ = xj for all j ∈ {1, .., m}.
Proof. By Lemma 2 and the definition of B˜Rf,ε, if x ∈ B˜Rf,ε(x), then there exists
σ ∈ Bf,ε (x) ⊆ Φf,ε (x) such that λjσ = xj for all j ∈ {1, ..., m}. Remark 4 yields that
σ is an ε-estimated equilibrium. 
Lemma 4 If λ is strongly continuous, then B˜Rf,ε(x) is nonempty and convex for all
x ∈ ∆m.
Proof. Fix x ∈ ∆m and η ∈ (0, ε). Since f satisfies (1), recall that
∀t ∈ T, ∀z ∈ ∆, ∃γt,z ∈ ∆ s.t. ∀a ∈ A ft (a, γt,z, z) = 0 (17)
Since x is given, define β ∈ ∆T to be such that β (t) = γt,xpi(t) for all t ∈ T . Note that
β (t) ∈ ∆ satisfies ft
(
a, β (t) , xpi(t)
)
= 0 < η for all a ∈ A and for all t ∈ T . Since A
is finite, for each t ∈ T choose σ (t) ∈ A such that ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for
all a ∈ A. This defines a function σ : T → A, that is σ ∈ Σ, such that σ ∈ Φf,η (x).
By Lemma 2, we have that σ ∈ Bf,ε (x) and (λjσ)mj=1 ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x). Convexity is a
consequence of the following two observations:
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1. By Lemma 1 and since each λj is strongly continuous, recall that {(λjσ)mj=1 | σ ∈
Sel
(
BRxf,η
)} is a convex subset of ∆m for all η ∈ (0, ε).
2. By (16), we have that
B˜Rf,ε (x) =
⋃
η∈(0,ε)
{(
λjσ
)m
j=1
| σ ∈ Sel (BRxf,η)}
It follows that B˜Rf,ε (x) is the union of a chain of convex sets,
37 proving convexity.

For the next result recall that a) d∆ is the distance on ∆ induced by the Euclidean
norm; b) we say that f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with
respect to the third argument if and only if for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such
that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ |ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
The intuition behind the proof of the next lemma is that if a strategy σ was β-optimal
and β was ε-consistent, given x, small perturbations of x do not disrupt optimality
and ε-consistency.
Lemma 5 If f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect
to the third argument, then B˜R
−1
f,ε (y) is open for all y ∈ ∆m.
Proof. Fix y ∈ ∆m. Recall that B˜R−1f,ε (y) =
{
x ∈ ∆m | y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x)
}
. Note that
x ∈ B˜R−1f,ε (y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x)
and B˜R
−1
f,ε (y) is open if and only if “for each x¯ such that y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x¯), there exists
a ball in ∆m of radius δ and center x¯ such that y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x) for all x ∈ Bδ (x¯)”.
Now arbitrarily choose x¯ such that y ∈ B˜Rf,ε(x¯). By definition of B˜Rf,ε(x¯), there
exist σ ∈ Bf,ε (x¯) ⊆ Σ and β ∈ ∆T such that
1. λjσ = yj for all j ∈ {1, ..., m};
37Recall that if 0 < η < η′, then
BRf,η (t,x) ⊆ BRf,η′ (t,x) ∀t ∈ T, ∀x ∈ ∆m
This implies that Sel
(
BR
x
f,η
)
= Φf,η (x) ⊆ Φf,η′ (x) = Sel
(
BR
x
f,η′
)
for all x ∈ ∆m.
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2. supt∈T ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t)
)
< ε;
3. ut (σ(t), β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) for all a ∈ A and for all t ∈ T .
By point 2, there exists ε¯ ∈ (0, ε) such that
sup
t∈T
ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t)
)
< ε¯ < ε
Let εˆ ∈ (0, ε−ε¯
2
)
. Since f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous
with respect to the third argument, there exists δεˆ > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δεˆ =⇒ |ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| < εˆ ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
For each x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯) note that d∆ (xj , x¯j) < δεˆ for all j ∈ {1, ..., m}. This implies that
for each t ∈ T and for each x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯)∣∣ft (σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t))− ft (σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t))∣∣ < εˆ
Since ft ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T , it follows that for each t ∈ T and for each x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯)
ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t)
)
=
∣∣ft (σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t))∣∣
≤ ∣∣ft (σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t))∣∣ + ∣∣ft (σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t))− ft (σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t))∣∣
= ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t)
)
+
∣∣ft (σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t))− ft (σ (t) , β (t) , x¯pi(t))∣∣
< ε¯+ εˆ
This implies that
sup
t∈T
ft
(
σ (t) , β (t) , xpi(t)
) ≤ ε¯+ εˆ < ε¯+ ε
2
< ε ∀x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯)
In other words, for each x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯) we have that σ ∈ Σ is such that the same β ∈ ∆T
of above satisfies points 2 and 3, but with x in place of x¯. This yields that σ ∈ Bf,ε (x)
for all x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯). Since y = (yj)mj=1 = (λjσ)
m
j=1, we obtain that y ∈ B˜Rf,ε (x) for all
x ∈ Bδεˆ (x¯), proving the statement. 
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 3, it is enough to show that B˜Rf,ε : ∆
m ⇒ ∆m has
a fixed point. Clearly, ∆m ⊆ (Rn)m is nonempty, compact, and convex. By Lemmas 4
and 5, B˜Rf,ε has nonempty and convex values and B˜R
−1
f,ε (y) is open for all y ∈ ∆m.
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By Browder’s Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences (see Theorem 1 of Browder
[8]), B˜Rf,ε has a fixed point. 
We next prove the remaining results of the main text.
Proof of Corollary 1. It is enough to observe that a nonatomic game with message
feedback can be mapped into a nonatomic game with estimation feedback where f is
defined as in (4) and Π = {T1}.38 With this identification, an ε-estimated equilibrium
is a self-confirming ε-equilibrium. By Theorem 1, it is then enough to show that
f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the third
argument. Since m = (mt)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with
respect to the second argument, we have that for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such
that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ d (mt (a, x) , mt (a, y)) < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A (18)
Since for each t ∈ T we have that ft (a, x, y) = d (mt (a, x) , mt (a, y)) for all a ∈ A and
for all x, y ∈ ∆, observe that
|ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| = |d (mt (a, γ) , mt (a, x))− d (mt (a, γ) , mt (a, y))|
≤ d (mt (a, x) , mt (a, y)) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀x, y, γ ∈ ∆
By (18), we can conclude that for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒
|ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| ≤ d (mt (a, x) , mt (a, y)) < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
proving equicontinuity with respect to the third argument of f . 
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider the nonatomic game G = ((T, λ) , A, u) and ε > 0.
Since u = (ut)t∈T is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the
second argument, we have that for each εˆ > 0 there exists δεˆ > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δεˆ =⇒ |ut (a, x)− ut (a, y)| < εˆ ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A (19)
Consider the profile m = (mt)t∈T of message functions such that each mt : A×∆→ ∆
is defined to be such that
mt (a, x) = x ∀a ∈ A, ∀x ∈ ∆
38Thus, m = 1, T1 = T , and pi (t) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
36
Note that in this case (M, d) = (∆, d∆). Clearly, m = (mt)t∈T is a family of functions
which is equicontinuous with respect to the second argument. Given ε > 0, consider
δε/2 > 0 as in (19). By Corollary 1, we have that there exists a self-confirming δε/2/2-
equilibrium σ ∈ Σ, that is, there exists β ∈ ∆T such that
1 = λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad (mt (σ (t) , β (t)) , mt (σ (t) , λσ)) ≤ δε/2/2
})
= λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , λσ) ≤ δε/2/2
})
Define by O the set of “optimizing” players
O =
{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , λσ) ≤ δε/2/2
}
Since u satisfies (19), note that if t ∈ O, then we have that d∆ (β (t) , λσ) ≤ δε/2/2 <
δε/2 which implies that for each a ∈ A
|ut (σ (t) , β (t))− ut (σ (t) , λσ)| < ε
2
and |ut (a, β (t))− ut (a, λσ)| < ε
2
Since t ∈ O, we can conclude that
ut (σ (t) , λσ) > ut (σ (t) , β (t))− ε
2
≥ ut (a, β (t))− ε
2
> ut (a, λσ)− ε
2
− ε
2
= ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A
Since t was arbitrarily chosen in O, we have that
O ⊆ {t ∈ T | ut (σ (t) , λσ) ≥ ut (a, λσ)− ε ∀a ∈ A}
Since O has mass 1, it follows that σ ∈ Σ is an ε-Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Corollary 3. It is enough to observe that a nonatomic game with a neighbor-
hood structure can be mapped into a nonatomic game with estimation feedback where
f is defined as in (8). With this identification, an ε-estimated equilibrium is a peer-
confirming ε-equilibrium. By Theorem 1, it is then enough to show that f = (ft)t∈T
is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the third argument.
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But, note that
|ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| = |d∆ (γ, x)− d∆ (γ, y)| ≤ d∆ (x, y) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
trivially proving equicontinuity with respect to the third argument of f . 
We conclude by proving Corollary 4. But, before doing so, we need to make
an intermediate observation. Consider a statistical divergence D. Recall that D :
∆ × ∆o → [0,∞) is a jointly convex and continuous function. Denote by K the
collection of all nonempty compact sets of ∆. We endow K with the Hausdorff distance
(see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [1, Chapter 3, Sections 16 and 17]). We denote by Q¯
a compact set of K such that each Q ∈ Q¯ is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset
of ∆o. Given x ∈ ∆ and Q ∈ Q¯, consider the minimization problem
minD (x||y) sub to y ∈ Q
Define µ : ∆×Q¯⇒ ∆ to be the solution correspondence of this minimization problem,
that is, for each x ∈ ∆ and for each Q ∈ Q¯,
µ (x,Q) =
{
z ∈ ∆ : z ∈ Q and D (x||z) = min
y∈Q
D (x||y)
}
By Berge’s maximum theorem, note that µ is upper hemicontinuous when ∆ × Q¯ is
endowed with the product topology. In particular, if D is strictly convex with respect
to the second argument, µ is single-valued, that is, µ is a continuous function. Finally,
define the map g : ∆×∆× Q¯ → [0,∞) by
g (β, x,Q) = d∆ (β, µ (x,Q)) ∀β, x ∈ ∆, ∀Q ∈ Q¯
Since µ is a continuous function, it follows that g is continuous when ∆ × ∆ × Q¯ is
endowed with the product topology. By Aliprantis and Border [1, Corollary 3.31] and
since ∆×∆× Q¯ is a compact metric space, g is uniformly continuous.
Proof of Corollary 4. Set Q¯ = clQ. By point 4 of Remark 3, note that Q¯ is a
compact subset of K such that each Q ∈ Q¯ is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset
of ∆o. For each t ∈ T define ft : A×∆×∆→ [0,∞) by
ft (a, γ, x) = g (γ, x,Qt) ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ, x ∈ ∆ (20)
38
It is then enough to observe that a nonatomic game with model misspecification can be
mapped into a nonatomic game with estimation feedback where f is defined as in (20)
and Π = {T1}.39 With this identification, an ε-estimated equilibrium is an ε-BNE. By
Theorem 1, it is then enough to show that f = (ft)t∈T is a family of functions which
is equicontinuous with respect to the third argument. Since g is uniformly continuous,
the statement is trivially true. 
The proof of the last two points of Remark 3 is routine. Thus, we conclude by only
proving point 2.
Proof of point 2 of Remark 3. Set Q¯ = clQ. Note that Q¯ is a compact subset of
K such that each Q ∈ Q¯ is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of ∆o. For each
t ∈ T define ft : A×∆×∆→ [0,∞) as in the proof of Corollary 4, that is,
ft (a, γ, x) = g (γ, x,Qt) ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ, x ∈ ∆
Since g is continuous and ∆×∆×Q¯ is compact, observe that g ≥ 0 takes a maximum
value M ≥ 0. Define the profile of feedback functions f˜ to be such that for each t ∈ T
f˜t (a, γ, x) =
{
ft (a, γ, x) γ ∈ Qt
M + 1 γ 6∈ Qt
∀a ∈ A, ∀γ, x ∈ ∆
Note that each f˜t satisfies (1). By the proof of Corollary 4, f = (ft)t∈T is a family of
functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the third argument. It follows that
for each ε > 0 there exists δε > 0 such that
d∆ (x, y) < δε =⇒ |ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| < ε ∀t ∈ T, ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ ∆
Consider x, y ∈ ∆ such that d∆ (x, y) < δε and consider t ∈ T , a ∈ A, and γ ∈ ∆. We
have two cases, either γ ∈ Qt or γ 6∈ Qt. In the first case,
∣∣∣f˜t (a, γ, x)− f˜t (a, γ, y)∣∣∣ =
|ft (a, γ, x)− ft (a, γ, y)| < ε, while in the second case
∣∣∣f˜t (a, γ, x)− f˜t (a, γ, y)∣∣∣ =
|M + 1− (M + 1)| = 0 < ε. Since t, a, and γ were chosen arbitrarily, it follows
that f˜ =
(
f˜t
)
t∈T
is a family of functions which is equicontinuous with respect to the
third argument. Next, we can consider the nonatomic game with estimation feedback(
(T, λ) , A, u, (Π, pi) , f˜
)
, where Π = {T1}.40 By Theorem 1, we have that for each
39Thus, m = 1, T1 = T , and pi (t) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
40Thus, m = 1, T1 = T , and pi (t) = 1 for all t ∈ T .
39
ε˜ > 0 there exists an ε˜-estimated equilibrium σ for this game, that is, there exists
β ∈ ∆T such that
λ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Af˜t (σ (t) , β (t) , λσ) ≤ ε˜
})
= 1
If given ε > 0 we define ε˜ = min{M+1,ε}
2
> 0, since ε˜ < M + 1, ε, then we have that{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Af˜t (σ (t) , β (t) , λσ) ≤ ε˜
}
⊆
{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Aft (σ (t) , β (t) , λσ) ≤ ε˜ and β (t) ∈ Qt
}
⊆
{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , argminz∈Qt D (λσ||z)) ≤ ε˜ and β (t) ∈ Qt
}
⊆
{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣∣∣ ut (σ (t) , β (t)) ≥ ut (a, β (t)) ∀a ∈ Ad∆ (β (t) , argminz∈Qt D (λσ||z)) ≤ ε and β (t) ∈ Qt
}
yielding the statement. 
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